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The racial politics of international criminal law has been the subject of controversy for a 
considerable amount of time. The conceptualization of “race” in the crime of genocide has, in 
particular, been persistently problematic. Apart from having avoided interpreting “race” in the 
crime of genocide altogether in some instances, international tribunals and authors have developed 
inconsistent and ambiguous methods of interpretations for genocidal acts committed against a 
racial group. As a result, international criminal law has produced interpretations of “race” in the 
crime of genocide that have fallen short of the strict rules of legal interpretation. Further, such 
interpretations have been inconsistent with both the very specific historical production of “race” 
and “racism” and the very specific way in which racial hegemony continues to shape contemporary 
law and society. In light of this, this study proposes an alternative theorisation of “race” for the 
crime of genocide using a Critical Race Theory perspective. Complementary to this endeavor, this 
study particularly considers South Africa’s unique race discourse and its possible implications for 
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Following the horrors of the Second World War and the atrocities of the Holocaust, the 
international community resolved to criminalize acts of genocide under international law.1 The 
resultant Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide2 (hereinafter the 
Convention or the Genocide Convention)3 seeks to protect four specific groups from intentional 
physical destruction, namely: national, ethnical, racial and religious groups.4 Article II of the 
Convention reads: “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such (…).”5 This definition of genocide has been identically reproduced in Article 6 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the Rome Statute). 6  
Since its implementation, several states have ratified the Genocide Convention and domesticated 
the crime of genocide under their national criminal laws.7 For its part, South Africa ratified the 
Genocide Convention in 1998, thereby creating an international legal obligation on the state to 
prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators of genocide.8 What is more is that South Africa is under 
a primary obligation to domestically prosecute the crime of genocide, pursuant to its domestic 
incorporation of the Rome Statute, via the Rome Statute Act, in 2002.9 It is worth noting that the 
 
1 D L Nersessian ‘The Razor's Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups under the Genocide Convention’ (2003) 
36 Cornell International Law Journal 294. 
2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951), 
adopted by G.A. Res. 260(IIl)(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).  
3 The final version of the Convention was unanimously agreed upon in the General Assembly on December 9, 1948 
and came into effect in January 1951. 
4 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, article II. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See also article 2 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and article 4 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
7 Nersessian (note 1 above; 294). 
8 H J Van der Merwe ‘The Prosecution of Incitement to Genocide in South Africa’ (2013) 16(5) PER/PELJ  340/614; 
Also included is an obligation to prosecute or extradite perpetrators of direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide. Ibid. 
9 C Gevers ‘International Criminal Law in South Africa’ in E de Wet, H Hestermeyer & R Wolfrum (ed) The 
Implementation of International Law in Germany and South Africa (2015) 415. This obligation to prosecute 
international crimes is not, however, mandatory. Our courts can decline or be unable to prosecute international crimes. 
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definition of genocide as per the Rome Statute (which replicates that contained in the Genocide 
Convention) has also been directly incorporated into our domestic law through the Rome Statute 
Act.10 
A notable feature of the common genocide provision is its failure to accord substantive definitions 
to the four protected groups.11 As explained further in part II, numerous complications have arisen 
on account of this silence, particularly insofar as determining who falls within the ambit of these 
national, ethnical, racial or religious groups.12 International criminal tribunals have generally 
sought to establish group membership by applying either: (1) an objective approach (where the 
group’s existence is dependent upon whether it is a “stable and permanent” fact); (2)  a subjective 
approach (where the existence of the group is dependent upon the perception of the perpetrator as 
such or on the extent of self-identification by the members themselves); or (3) a mixed approach 
(where a perpetrator’s subjective construction of a protected group is coupled with a baseline 
criterion of objectivity). While international tribunals traditionally followed an objective approach, 
some scholars have noted a “quiet shift”  in more current international jurisprudence towards using 
the subjective approach.13 On the whole, however, the approaches taken by international tribunals 
have been fraught with inconsistency and ambiguity.14  
The interpretation of genocidal acts committed against a racial group has been particularly 
problematic. Since the “appearance” of “race” in the international criminal law arena, the 
international legal community has either evaded defining “racial groups” altogether or has silenced 
 
L Chenwi & S Franziska ‘South Africa’s Competing Obligations in Relation to International Crimes’ (2015) 7 
Constitutional Court Review 215. 
10 Gevers (note 10 above; 416). Additionally, section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 
of 1996 (hereinafter the 1996 Constitution) allows for the crime of genocide to be prosecuted via direct application of 
customary international law. See Gevers (note 10 above; 425) in this regard.  
11 C Lingaas ‘Defining the Protected Groups of Genocide through the Case Law of International Courts’ 2015 ICD 
Brief 18 at 2. 
12 See for instance W A Schabas ‘Groups Protected by the Genocide Convention: Conflicting Interpretations from the 
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda’ (2000) 6 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law and G 
Verdirame ‘The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ (2000) 49 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly who discuss some of the interpretive complications that have arisen regarding the 
protected groups under the Genocide Convention.  
13 Verdirame (note 12 above; 592 & 594); C Lingaas ‘The Elephant in the Room: The Uneasy Task of Defining 
‘Racial’ in International Criminal Law’ (2015) 15 International Criminal Law Review 501.  
14 See for instance Schabas (note 12 above); Verdirame (note 12 above) and Lingaas (note 11 above).  
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the notion of “race” by detrimentally subsuming it under the guise of ethnicity.  Notably, 
substantive attempts to define the “racial group” in the crime of genocide seemed to have only 
emerge two years after, and subsequently more than a decade thereafter, the institution of the 
Genocide Convention. Prior to these attempts, the Genocide Convention had been promulgated 
against a history that has arguably tainted subsequent understandings of “race” and genocide.15  
In the first attempt to interpret “racial groups”, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(hereinafter the ICTR) adopted a purely objective approach, defining the category with reference 
to biological markers of identity.16 Despite its explicit approval of according objective definitions 
to national, ethnical, racial and religious groups, however, the Trial Chamber failed to classify the 
Rwandan Tutsi population into one of the distinct protected groups under the crime of genocide. 
The Trial Chamber in fact evaded the problem of definition altogether by resorting to abstraction: 
finding that article II of the Genocide Convention should apply to “all stable and permanent 
groups”, irrespective of whether or not the Tutsis could precisely be classified as a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group.17  
Notably, Schabas similarly evades defining each protected group under the Genocide Convention 
through abstraction. Schabas argues that the four categories in the Genocide Convention should 
be regarded as “four corner posts”, where the categories help to define one another, overlap with 
each other and limit the categories of the countless number of groups that could conceivably find 
protection under the Convention.18 Such an approach has been termed an ‘ensemble’ or ‘holistic’ 
approach, and has sustained heavy criticism on account of its imprecise formulation of the 
 
15 The Genocide Convention being promulgated as a legal reaction to the Holocaust had the effect of genocide 
becoming historically entangled to refer to the suffering of the Jewish people before and during the Second World 
War. C Tournaye ‘Genocidal Intent before the ICTY’ (2003) 52(2) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
447. The international conceptualization of race, in particular, is purported to have been influenced by Nazi racial 
ideology at the time. C Lingaas ‘Imagined Identities: Defining the Racial Group in the Crime of Genocide’ (2016) 
10(1) Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 84. Lingaas notes that, “the Holocaust was still 
ongoing when Lemkin [who conceptualized the crime of genocide] published his book, and undoubtedly the Nazi 
propaganda terminology influenced his use of the term race”. Ibid 84. See also Schabas (note 13 above; 381) for 
further examples on how international bodies referred to Germans and Jews as distinct races). These understandings 
of race were captured in the Genocide Convention. Lingaas (note 16; 83). 
16 The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998) at paras. 514 & 516. This 
approach has been criticized by some for preserving a scientifically discredited means of human classification. See 
for instance Lingaas (note 12 above). 
17Akayesu (note 17 above) 516. 
18 Schabas (note 12 above; 385). 
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protected groups of genocide.19 Lippman also avoids according a substantive definition to a racial 
group, claiming that, “[t]he concept of racial groups is self-evident”.20  
Analysis of the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(hereinafter the ICTY) likewise reveals a general tendency to avoid according a definition to racial 
groups altogether.21 For instance, in the Krstic Trial Judgement22 of the ICTY the Trial Chamber 
refused to distinctly classify the Bosnian Muslims as an ethnic, a racial, a national, or a religious 
group.23 In support of its decision, after considering the drafting history of the Genocide 
Convention and the work conducted in the context of the international protection of minorities, the 
Trial Chamber held that there is no clear distinction in law between national, ethnical, religious or 
racial groups.24  
When it came to the interpretation of “racial groups” in particular, the Trial Chamber in Krstic 
simply reemphasized the non-distinction in substance between “racial groups” and the other 
protected groups, instead of endeavoring to substantively define “racial groups” as a category in 
and of itself: 
In a study conducted for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities in 1979, F. Capotorti commented that “the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities decided, in 1950, to replace the word 'racial’ by the 
word 'ethnic’ in all references to minority groups described by their ethnic origin”. The 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines racial 
 
19 Lingaas (note 16 above; 86).  
20 Matthew Lippman, “Genocide,” in International Criminal Law: Sources, Subjects, and Contents, ed. M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 412. 
21 Tournaye (note 16 above; 457 & 458). 
22 The Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, IT-98-33-T (2 Aug 2001). 
23 Krstic (note 25 above) 559 & 560. 
24 The Trial Chamber held at para 555 that, “the concepts of protected groups and national minorities partially overlap 




discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin”.25 
This approach marks a stark contrast to that taken in Akayesu, where the Trial Chamber of the 
ICTR, at the least, endeavored to separately define, albeit controversially, each of the protected 
groups, including “racial groups”.26  
A general unease with the term “racial group”,27 and its supposedly vague “a priori” nature,28 have 
been advanced as explanations for why both international tribunals and scholars have either 
avoided interpreting “racial group” altogether or have subsumed the concept into a single criterion 
for interpreting all four of the protected groups.  However, authors have sought to demystify the 
racial politics of international criminal law, arguing that this avoidance and silencing of race is, in 
actuality, deliberate.29  
For instance, Shilliam scrutinizes the research agendas of race in International Relations, with 
particular focus on the UNESCO ‘statements on race’. The author argues that the UNESCO 
‘statements on race’ appear to have purposely favored the narrative of the master.30 The main 
purpose of the 1950 and 1951 statements were seemingly aimed towards “separating the biological 
fact of race from its social myth”, as a deliberate attempt to replace the unscientific nature of race 
with a more “preferable classificatory regime” - ethnicity.31 As a result of these efforts, racial 
identities arguably became subsumed into harmless ethnic categorizations.32 The fourth UNESCO 
‘statement on race’ was, once again, aimed towards disavowing the alleged biological origin of 
the social myth of race in an effort to strip race of its true historical context and instead collapse it 
 
25 Krstic (note 25 above) 555. 
26 Akayesu (note 17 above) 515-515. 
27 Schabas (note 13 above; 380). 
28 Lingaas (note 14 above; 495). 
29 See for instance R Shilliam ‘Race and Research Agendas’ (2013) 26(1) Cambridge Review of International Affairs; 
R C DeFalco & F Megret ‘The Invisibility of Race at the ICC: Lessons from the US Criminal Justice System’ (2019) 
7(1) London Review of International Law and C Gevers ‘Africa and International Criminal Law’ in KJ Heller et al. 
(eds) Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law (Oxford UP, forthcoming). 
30 Shilliam (note 35 above; 153). 
31 Ibid. 
32 After all, ethnicity had not been historically associated with supremist hierarchy. Ibid. 
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into a depoliticized understanding of ethnicity.33 To achieve this, racism was more blatantly linked 
with slavery, colonialism and anti-Semitism.34  
The more current racial politics of the international criminal court (ICC) has been criticized for 
promoting an “overly thin” understanding racism, more particularly on account of it 
conceptualizing racism to be a product of individual, deliberate racist acts rather than that which 
is entrenched and perpetuated through socio-legal structures.35 The Genocide Convention in 
particular had increasingly been interpreted to mean crimes against “physical integrity”, causing a 
silent shift away from implicating political, social and legal mechanisms that may have been 
designed to bring about genocidal effects (such as the Apartheid regime).36  
From all of the above, it is evident that defining “race” in the crime of genocide has been, and 
arguably continues to be, problematic for a number of reasons. As explained above, international 
criminal law has generally completely avoided according distinct and substantive definitions to 
“racial groups” (as illustrated above), either: through complete circumvention thereof; by applying 
generic abstractions to be applied to all four protected groups; or through the surreptitious 
“silencing” of racial hegemony under the guise of ethnicity.  Adding to this, those attempts by 
international tribunals and scholars to substantively interpret “racial groups” through objective and 
subjective lenses have created a pendulum effect. Particularly when it comes to the interpretation 
of the ‘racial group’ category, there seemingly exists a “back-and-forth” that has resulted in 
 
33 Ibid 154. 
34 Ibid 154. The 1967 UNESCO statement reads, “Many forms of racism have arisen out of the conditions of conquest 
– as exemplified in the case of Indians in the New World, out of justification of Negro slavery… and out of colonial 
relationship. Among other examples is that of anti-Semitism, which has played a particular role in history, with Jews 
being chosen as scapegoat to take the blame for the problems and crises met by many societies” (emphasis added).  
UNESCO ‘Statement on Race and Racial Prejudice 1967’ HonestThinking  at 7 available at , accessed on 30 June 
2019. Further, whilst the statement referred to anti-colonial struggles aimed towards ‘eliminating the scourge of 
racism’, it simultaneously disapproved of the ways in which the ethnic groups in Western cultures had to surrender 
their cultural identities for the sake of assimilating. Shilliam (note 35 above; 154).  
35 Shilliam (note 33 above; 55). De Falco and Megret particularly seek to expose how the ICC’s seemingly deliberate 
blindness towards race, as an anti-racist strategy, may very well be an implicit perpetuation of racism. DeFalco & 
Megret (note 33 above; 56). This charge is made even more plausible by the “silent” historical production of racial 
categorization that international criminal law has been implicated in, to seemingly reinforce its racial hegemony over 
Black Africans. DeFalco & Megret (note 33 above; 71 & 76).  
36 A Sitze ‘The Crime of Apartheid: Genealogy of a Successful Failure’ (2019) 7(2) London Review of International 
Law 11 of draft. 
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scholars consistently, and problematically, assuming an ahistorical understanding of “race” and 
racial hegemony. 
1.2. Problem statement 
It has been observed from the above that international criminal law has produced interpretations 
of “race” in the crime of genocide that are inconsistent with both the historical production of “race” 
and “racism” and the ways in which racial hegemony continues to shape contemporary law and 
society.  
1.3. Statement of purpose and rationale 
This study proposes an alternative theorisation of “race” for the crime of genocide using a Critical 
Race Theory perspective.  
International criminal law is legally bound to offer a clear definition of “racial groups”, as a distinct 
category in its own right, lest the category be regarded too redundant and ambiguous to be legally 
sound.  Strict rules of legal interpretation demand for legal terms to have precise meaning because, 
"each individual word employed in a legal document implies and contributes to an autonomous 
meaning and must hence be interpreted as a stand-alone component within the norm's substance".37 
The principle of nullen crimen sine legal under international and domestic criminal law 
additionally begs for clear, precise and predictable definitions.38  
Regarding the South African position, the  domestic interpretation of “race”, if an alleged genocide 
were to come to South African courts, arguably calls for thoughtful consideration. This is 
particularly the case when considering South Africa’s unique etymology of “race” (from the formal 
institutionalization of apartheid in 1948 whilst genocidal acts against a racial group were being 
outlawed internationally, to the demise of formal apartheid, juxtaposed against the growing chasm 
of racial inequality in contemporary South Africa). South Africa’s unique race discourse also 
 
37 C Tams, L Berster & B Schiffbauer Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: A 
Commentary (2014) 103. 
38 Lingaas (note 14 above; 493). 
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situates it in a complementary position to the critical engagements and recommendations proposed 
in this study. This will be illustrated throughout the study.  
1.4. Research questions 
The following questions will aid the examination of this study: 
• How is the notion of “race” conceptualized under international criminal law? 
• How is “race” conceptualized in pre-democratic and contemporary South African socio-
legal discourse?  
• What are the implications of using these conceptualizations in the interpretation of 
genocidal acts committed against a “racial group”, both internationally and in South 
Africa? 
• Can Critical Race Theory aid in providing a more legally and theoretically sound 
interpretation of “racial groups” in the crime of genocide? 
 
1.5. Research methodology 
This study involves desktop-research and is based on a qualitative approach. The desktop-research 
will rely predominantly on secondary sources, such as article journals and textbooks, for the 
purposes of gathering a broad perspective on the discourse surrounding the topic. Primary sources 
(such as international conventions, South African national legislation, international case law and 
South African domestic case law) will also be consulted and referenced.  
1.6. Structure  
Part I: ‘Introduction’. This part will provide a broad overview of the research’s endeavor to find 
an alternative conceptualization of “race” in the crime of genocide. The study will be situated 
within its particular context and its aims will be made explicit. This part will also include synopses 
of forthcoming discussions regarding scholarly discourse surrounding the topic. 
Part II: ‘Racial Theories’. This part of the study seeks to broadly illustrate, and critically engage 
with, the dominant, competing conceptualizations of “race” in global and South African race 
discourse. This will be undertaken primarily with reference to Glasgow’s three conceptualizations 
14 
 
of racial theories, namely: racial conservationism, racial eliminativism and racial 
reconstructionism.39 
Part III: ‘Race and International Criminal Law’. This part of the study considers and analyzes the 
international criminal law conceptualization of “race” as it relates to the crime of genocide.  The 
discussions herein will particularly focus on how international tribunals and scholars have sought 
to establish group membership (in general) and race (in particular) under the genocide provisions. 
Part IV: ‘A Race-conscious Approach’. After gathering its final perspectives on the matter, this 
part considers South African race discourse and thereafter calls for an alternative theorisation of 
“race” for the crime of genocide.  In its final analysis, the possible legal and theoretical 
implications of using Critical Race Theory as an interpretive tool for South African domestic 
prosecutions of genocide on the basis of race are considered. 
1.7. Conclusion  
This introductory part of the study outlined the background of the study, its research methodology 
and its aims and rationale. It further provided a brief review of relevant literature, which 
highlighted the complexities that have come with interpreting the “racial group” in the crime of 
genocide. The following part will seek to provide a conceptual disaggregation of “race”, using 
 




Glasgow’s distinction between three dominant and competing conceptualizations of “race” in 
























RACE THEORIES: A PRIMER 
2.1. Introduction 
The concept of “race” has been plagued with definitional difficulties and controversy since its 
introduction. On some readings, “race” is not confined to one particular meaning.40 Lingaas 
suggests that the concept of “race” is fluid, and that interpretation of the notion shifts between 
different points in history and different societies.41 Compounding the issue further, a variety of 
widely used dictionaries have commonly defined the notion with reference to hereditary 
characteristics or a person’s physiology,42 notwithstanding that there is wide scientific consensus 
that “race” is not an objective biological feature of humans and that it is, rather, a social 
construction.43 The contemporary impetus towards regarding “race” as a social construct has also 
seemingly fostered several theoretical and ideological implications for legal, social and political 
discourse, with a number of calls being made for either the inclusion or exclusion of the mention 
of ‘race’. 
This part of the study seeks to broadly illustrate the dominant, competing conceptualizations of 
“race” in contemporary discourse (namely, racial conservationism, racial eliminativism and racial 
reconstructionism).44 Briefly, racial conservationism argues for racial categories and markers to 
 
40 ‘Race’ (noun) is defined by a number of well-known dictionaries, with each containing more than one formal 
definition of ‘race’. The Lexico dictionary defines ‘race’ as, inter alia, “Each of the major divisions of humankind 
having distinct physical characteristics; A fact or condition of belonging to a racial division or group; the qualities or 
characteristics associated with this; A group of people sharing the same culture, history, language, etc.; an ethnic 
group. ‘Race’ available at https://www.lexico.com/definition/race, accessed on 7 April 2019. The Merriam-Webster 
dictionary defines it as, inter alia, “A family, tribe, or nation belonging to the same stock; a category of humankind 
that shares certain distinctive physical traits’. ‘Race’ available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/race, 
accessed 7 April 2019. The Macmillan Dictionary defines ‘race’ to be, inter alia, “People who are similar because 
they have the same skin colour or other physical features; a group of people who are similar because they speak the 
same language or have the same history or customs”. ‘Race’ available at 
https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/race_1, accessed on 7 April 2019.  
41 Lingaas (note 14 above; 485). 
42 See note 49 above. 
43 Lingaas (note 14 above; 485-486). 
44 Glasgow (note 46 above). 
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be conserved45, racial eliminativism argues for any references to “race” and racial categorization 
to be removed from our legal practices, systems, discourses and private attitudes,46 and racial 
reconstructionism advocates for a race-conscious approach, which calls for racial discourse to be 
reconstructed in such a way that it that it no longer maintains and produces racial hegemony.47 
Throughout this discussion a Critical Race Theory analysis of current race discourse will be 
undertaken. This will be done for the purpose of problematizing the applicability of these 
theorisations in the interpretation of “racial groups” in the crime of genocide. This critical 
engagement will be complemented by analyses of South Africa’s pre- and post-1994 legal and 
public race discourse. Such a task will further seek to uncover the  racial ideologies inherent in 
adopting these conceptualizations in race discourse. An additional purpose is to later examine the 
compatibility of international race discourse and the crime of genocide with that of South Africa. 
Given the deeply rooted legacy of racism that continues to unsettle South African society 
structurally, according to Modiri, “….what meanings we attach to race, and how we choose to 
approach it, is an obviously important starting point”.48  
2.2.  Racial conservationism 
Proponents of racial conservationism argue for racial categories and labels to be preserved in 
contemporary discourse, on the basis of its presumably fundamental role in determining society’s 
truths, identities and power relations.49 Supporters of racial conservationism further argue for 
racial classifications to acquire legally protection.50 By preserving racial labels, the presence of 
racialized systems, practices and attitudes are too argued to be retained in modern discourse, 
justifying even those systems and thoughts that are guised under language and cultural heritage.51 
 
45 J M Modiri ‘The Colour of Law, Power and Knowledge: Introducing Critical Race Theory in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa’ 2012 SAJHR 413; Glasgow (note 48 above; 1 & 2). 
46 Modiri (note 54 above; 412). 
47 Ibid 413 & 414; Glasgow (note 48 above; 152). 
48Modiri (note 54 above; 411).  





Justification for racial conservationism is further premised on the purported materiality of racial 
identities in society in providing meaning to present life experiences and a means to accurately 
anticipate future life experiences.52 “Race” is thus conceptualized by conservationists to be a 
valuable cog in the functioning of society, even if it is no longer used to entrench oppression and 
inequality.  
It has been argued that racial conservationism can be utilized positively in present day discourse, 
to repair disparities caused by racial inequality and to create political and social alliances aimed at 
overcoming racism.53 The preservation of racial categorization is, however, arguably flawed on a 
number of fronts, not least for its insidious perpetuation of a false biological version of race in 
present-day discourse (one which had historically been used to justify exploitation, subordination 
of specific groups and the creation of racial hegemony). More specifically, it can be argued that 
these racist agendas have arguably been dragged into the present by socio-legal structures (which 
have had as much of a prominent role in entrenching such agendas in the past as it does in the 
present). 
The apartheid-state’s practice of racial classification is one such example of the use of racial 
conservationism and the problematic consequences that are allied to the conceptualization’s 
historical use. Apartheid biological and hereditary justifications for racial categorization were 
strategically masked by the apartheid state to be a more superficial, objective version (one that is 
associated with a person’s outer appearance, specifically the color of a person’s skin).54  
By bureaucratizing racial classification as a social concept, however, the apartheid state 
strategically circumvented the need for rigorous scientific defenses.55 In doing so, that practitioners 
of racial classification had carte blanche to ‘interpret the bureaucratic criteria for racial 
classification in ways that allowed them to draw widely and idiosyncratically on the popular 
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litanies of biological stereotypes’.56 These biological versions of race discreetly underpinned the 
racialization of society under apartheid; it became deeply subsumed into the materiality of the lives 
of South Africans through the workings of racially bias institutions, such as the law57. It manifested 
itself, however, in a more “objective” and obvious reality (what Posel argues to be a “common 
sense” understanding).58  
Notably, the Population Registrations Act 30 of 1950 (hereinafter Act 30 of 1950) encapsulated 
the Apartheid State’s bureaucratization of race as “common sense”.59 Three racial categories were 
defined in the Act as follows: 
A “white person” …a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is generally accepted as a 
white person, but does not include a person who, although in appearance obviously a white person, 
is generally accepted as a coloured person.60  
A "native"… a person who is in fact or is generally accepted as a member of any aboriginal race or 
tribe of Africa.61  
A “coloured” person… a person who is not a white person nor a native.62  
The Act clearly endorsed racial categorization on seemingly objective grounds (on the basis of a 
person’s outer appearance). As previously mentioned, Posel argues that the reason for this “more 
obvious” form of racial classification was to offset the expectation of scientific rigor in defining 
race, which would have otherwise led to the demise of apartheid project from the beginning.63 
Consequently, according to the author, the “common sense” racial designation adopted by the state 
became inextricably embedded in the subjective experience of race through the lived hierarchies 
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of class and status.64 As a result, the notion of race became an indisputable social construction, 
predicated upon popular biological stereotypes.65 The author further notes how the Act of 1950’s 
crystallization of a “common sense” racial classification became both the cause and effect of a 
person’s “future entitlements and prospects, as much as those that had marked that person’s 
past”.66  
Notwithstanding the repeal of the Population Registration Act of 1950, the “common sense” 
conceptualization of race proliferated during the apartheid era during the 1950s still seems to 
permeate present-day South African discourse. Arguably the most troubling and incessant avenues 
through which it is perpetuated are the structures and institutions that inform society.  
This argument is perhaps best exemplified by the recent debacle surrounding a controversial study 
conducted by the Sport Science Department of Stellenbosch University.67 The study culminated in 
the publication, and subsequent retraction, of an article by Nieuwoudt, Dickie, Coetsee, 
Engelbrecht, and Terblanche (2019), titled, ‘Age- and education-related effects on cognitive 
functioning in Colored South African women’.68 The study claimed that ‘Coloured’ women of 
South Africa have an increased risk for low cognitive functioning, due to a combination of 
(amongst others socio-demographic factors) ethnicity, low education levels, unhealthy lifestyle 
and employment.69 The published and peer-reviewed article was challenged by high levels of 
criticism, both nationally and internationally, on the basis of the study’s apparent racist and sexist 
underlying preconceptions about ‘Coloured’ women.70 The article was subsequently retracted after 
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a successful call for an online petition to remove the article, owing to its “colonial stereotyping of 
‘Coloured’ women”.71  
Hendricks, Kramer and Ratele best sum up, through a postcolonial critique, the troubling 
ideologies that the presuppositions adopted by the University assumed in their conducting of the 
study. They argue that the study, “draw[s] heavily on colonial racist stereotypes portraying all 
Coloured women as intellectually deficient and make sweeping racist and sexist generalisations 
from their study”.72 The scholars particularly recall how a specific understanding of “race” was 
disseminated and entrenched by apartheid segregationist practices since the 1950s, and thereafter 
argue that the study conducted by the University preserves the very ideological tenets of 
colonialism and apartheid.73 It does so through its use of the apartheid-engineered racial 
designation ‘Coloured’ as a stable variable for scientific research.74 According to the authors, such 
an approach “injudiciously homogenises people”, having the effect of reproducing harmful 
stereotypes and oppression disguised as a science.75  
Thus, racial conservationism still seems to find its sanctuary in institutions, like Stellenbosch 
University, and academic research. By attributing biological and social conditions exclusively to 
certain racial groups, it can be argued that there exists, at once, a perpetuation and a denial of the 
effects that segregationist and racist policies and practices of apartheid had (and continue to have) 
on different sectors of South African society. The denial is arguably manifest in a 
mischaracterization of the cause, through a failure to take into consideration the socio-economic 
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factors that has become inextricably linked to a person’s identity, through the workings of 
structural racism, since the apartheid era. 
2.3.Racial eliminativism 
Protagonists of racial eliminativism argue for the complete elimination of the notion of “race” from 
political and legal processes, private thoughts and means of identifications.76 It has been argued 
that the agenda behind approaching racial discourse through racial eliminativism is to achieve non-
racialization and harmony amongst a society that has been previously divided along racial lines.77 
In understanding racial eliminativism, Glasgow makes mention of three versions of racial 
eliminativism, namely; the ‘political version’, ‘public eliminativism’ and ‘global eliminativism’.78 
Glasgow argues that dissecting these versions are fundamental to evaluating eliminativist 
assertions.79 
The ‘political version’ calls for the elimination of racial categories from state policies, 
administrations and processes, whilst ‘public eliminativism’ calls for the removal of racial thinking 
from both politics and public and social discourse.80 Proponents of public eliminativism assert that, 
in order to facilitate the effective removal of race from public and social discourse, race is not to 
be recognized or used in a way that advances or disadvantages a particular group.81 Lastly, ‘global 
eliminativism’ not only calls for the removal of racial discourse from state and public spheres, but 
 








additionally argues for the elimination of racialized private thoughts and attitudes.82 Global 
eliminativism, thus, calls for the total purge of the very idea of race from our discourses.83  
Modiri argues that, although the racial eliminativism approach asserts important anti-racist claims, 
it inevitably normalizes the current state of affairs by denying the history of racialization.84 The 
author highlights how race has historically been institutionalized as a tool for domination, 
subordination and deprivation, and how structural racism continues to further these agendas in 
modern-day society.85 The author uses the affirmative action policy in South Africa to illustrate 
how adopting racial eliminativism would undermine attempts to redress systemic inequality.86 
Thus, racial eliminativism fails to recognize racism a systemic problem. 
The agenda of racial eliminativism to achieve non-racialization through a supposed ‘race-blind’ 
approach is, arguably, further perpetuated through the call for liberalism, one of the mainstream 
legal approaches against which Critical Race Theory has formed an oppositionist and radical 
movement.87 According to Modiri, liberalism advocates for a ‘color-blind’ approach to achieving 
non-racialization.88 However, Modiri emphasizes that this seemingly neutral approach, in fact, 
normalizes the status quo.89 Thus, similar to racial eliminativism, to adopt a liberalist approach to 
racial discourse is to overlook ‘the structural nature of racial power, the ingrained and banal nature 
of anti-black racism and the role of law in enforcing unearned white privileges’.90 
Most significantly, Modiri proposes that an additional, fundamental consequence of adopting a 
neutral and ‘color-blind’ approach to racial discourse is that racism becomes viewed from the 
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individual and abhorrent acts of racial discrimination, ‘committed by a conscious wrongdoer’.92 
As a  result, through an overemphasis on the individualized act of the perpetrator, the systemic 
nature of “race”, and its subordination through distribution of wealth, power and employment, is 
masked.93  
Upon this consideration, it can be reasoned that adopting a racial eliminativism approach to racial 
discourse means treating the notion of “race” as a purely subjective phenomenon, manufactured 
solely by the perpetrator. According to Modiri, through an ahistorical and privatized understanding 
of “race”, racism is seen as ‘irrational behavior and prejudice’, without which racism would not 
exist.94 The author argues that this irrational behavior is seen a deviation from the supposedly 
unbiased way of treating others and of the distribution of wealth, power and employment.95 Thus, 
according to the Modiri, the liberal legalist insists on ‘the dated formalist desire for neutral 
principles and reasoning (in the name of ‘jurisprudential  discipline’)’.96 These ‘race-neutral’, 
seemingly objective laws, however, only address individual and blatant acts of racism.97  
The result is a perpetuation of the idea that outside of a privatized understanding of “race”, “race” 
has no real presence and effect in law and legal processes.98 Upon this consideration, it can 
therefore be observed that adopting an eliminativist approach to race means that an act of racism 
becomes, instead, conditional upon and inseparable to an individual’s subjective construction of 
race. This perpetrator-centered approach arguably results in a failure address the structural power 
of race that is engrained into the modus operandi of law and society.  
2.4.Racial reconstructionism 
At its core, racial reconstructionism calls for a race conscious approach to current race discourse, 
where the manner in which certain racial groups have been either subordinated or privileged 
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through racial discourse is confronted.99 Reconstructionism implores the need to shed light on race 
and its implications in “our social, political and legal lives”, whilst at the same time taking race to 
be an ‘illusionary’ concept manufactured by social forces (i.e. a purely ‘social phenomenon’).100 
By recognizing it as such, one is able to (according to reconstructionists) confront the materiality 
of race in present ‘social, political and legal’ discourses and use it as tool for transcending the 
effects of a racialized history (where racial discourse is reconstructed in such a way that it that it 
no longer maintains and produces racial hegemony).101  
Building on Glasgow’s theory, Modiri calls for legal discourse regarding race to be approached 
from this race-conscious position.102 The author additionally argues that Critical Race Theory 
embraces the essence of this approach (although being a more radical version of it) and urges to 
engage with the complexities of racial discrimination in legal systems through the lens of 
critical/radical thought.103 Modiri proposes that racialization and racial oppression is, first and 
foremost, an institutional and systemic problem.104 The author rejects a conception of race that is 
founded on individual “prejudice and stereotyping based on skin colour”.105 Modiri notably argues 
that current legal scholarship on race is founded on Western and imperialist concepts of 
‘rationality’ ‘reason’ and ‘liberal paradigms’, which remain too ideologically limited to address 
the complexities of how racial hegemony is, in actuality, perpetuated through structures such as 
the law.106 White supremacy arguably manifests itself in “structures of power (economics, law, 
politics) and institutions of life (society, history, education, sex)”.107 Thus, by moving away from 
conservative, imperialist and liberal legal frameworks, and towards situating race at the center of 
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the modus operandi of legal systems, racial politics in law will be exposed and discourses on law 
and legal theory radically altered.108  
Taking racial reconstructionism a step further, to demystify liberalist and imperialist mainstream 
theories, Mills conceptualizes a more appropriate framework to be “global white supremacy”.109 
Mills uses “global white supremacy” to capture both “de facto … as well as de jure white privilege” 
(more broadly, European global domination that has patterned economies, politics and cultural 
power along racial lines).110 The author argues that white supremacy is evident in the current 
distribution of “goods and resources, status, and prestige” and that conceptualizing “global white 
supremacy” as a political system would allow for the recognition of (often ignored) racial realities, 
as well as various phenomena that seek to either enforce or resist the “global white” system.111  
2.5.Conclusion 
This part of the study broadly illustrated and critique the dominant, competing conceptualizations 
of “race” in contemporary race discourse, with reference to Glasgow’s distinction between racial 
conservationism, racial eliminativism and racial reconstructionism. In sum, it has been submitted 
that conceptualizing “race” through the lenses of racial conservationism and racial eliminativism 
produces ahistorical assumptions of the notion of “race”. In addition, both approaches to race 
discourse troublingly overlook the structural persistence of racial hegemony in contemporary 
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society. The next part of the study will specifically consider the international criminal law 






















RACE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL LAW 
3.1 Introduction 
This part of the study considers the international criminal law conception of “race” in the crime of 
genocide, with particular focus on how international tribunals and authors have vacillated 
generally between three ways of establishing group membership: (1) the objective approach 
(where a group is treated as a stable, permanent fact, often crystallizing biological understandings 
of race); (2) the subjective approach (where the existence of the group is dependent on the 
perception of the perpetrator as such or on the extent of self-identification by the members 
themselves); or (3) a mixed approach (where a subjective construction of a racial group is coupled 
with a baseline criterion of objectivity).   
Discrepancies in interpretation persist, however, in defining the four protected groups. Authors 
such as Schabas, Verdirame, Szpak, Nersessian, Tournaye and, more recently, Lingaas have 
acknowledged the presence of these definitional difficulties as a result of conflicting 
interpretations offered by international tribunals.112 Further, in light of this quandary such scholars 
have suggested tools of interpretation to define the “racial group” and, more broadly, the protected 
groups.  
It will be suggested, however, that both judicial interpretation and the tools of interpretation 
offered by international scholars are equally vexed in its understanding of “race”. It will be 
illustrated that the various interpretations of “race” offered have produced inconsistencies and 
ambiguities which are arguably detrimental to a proper conception of “race” and the crime of 
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genocide within South Africa’s domestic legal framework (an analysis which follow in part IV of 
the study). 
3.2. Defining the protected groups of genocide 
3.2.1. Objective approach 
The ICTR was the first international criminal tribunal to secure a conviction for the crime of 
genocide. The tribunal reasoned that it was imperative to objectively determine whether the Tutsi 
victims of the atrocities committed in Rwanda constituted “national, ethnic, religious or racial 
group” for the purposes of legally qualifying the atrocities as a genocide.113 Being the first 
genocide trial to come before an international tribunal, the ICTR undertook a seemingly detailed 
task of defining each of the four protected groups.  More specifically, the ICTR defined a racial 
group as follows: 
The conventional definition of racial group is based on the hereditary physical traits often 
identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious 
factors.114 (emphasis added)  
The ICTR’s construction of a “racial group” as a biological phenomenon has since been criticized 
on the basis of the wide scientific discreditation of there being a heritable gene for “race”.115 The 
ICTR’s approach has further been criticized for its predominantly objective reading of “race” that 
seemingly disregards the social and historical context of a group.116 
Notwithstanding the scientific consensus, however, a number of scholars have persisted in defining 
“racial groups” by way of “hereditary” physical appearance. Such scholars have advocated for 
either a purely objective classification of “racial groups” or a means of classification that 
incorporates a baseline criterion of objectivity. In Hans Vest’s definition of race, the author refers 
to physical characteristics or biological ancestry.117 Adding to this, LeBlanc defines race as 
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“associated with physical characteristics of a people such as color of skin”118, whilst Nsereko 
characterizes “racial groups (…) according to genetically transmitted differences”, using physical 
markers as a way of classification (such as skin colour, hair, eyes and stature).119 Similarly, Werle 
considers a “racial group” to be a social group that consists of individuals who genetically possess 
the same observable physical characteristics (such as skin color or physical stature).120 
In consideration of the above, it can be argued that the objective approach not only preserves an 
antiquated means of classification but runs the risk of biological racism being re-introduced 
through an overemphasis of corporeal markers of identity. Moreover, such an emphasis fails to 
address the role that structural racism continues to play in perpetuating racial hierarchy. 
3.2.2.  Subjective approach 
Shifting away from the predominantly objective approach taken by the Trial Chamber in Akayesu, 
the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kayeshema and Ruzindana121 adopted a starkly different 
method of establishing group membership under the crime of genocide, deciding that a subjective 
approach was to be adopted for determining group membership generally (as well as avoiding the 
“stable and permanent” criterion adopted in Akayesu).122 The Trial Chamber decided that because 
the Tutsis were an ethnic group as defined by Rwandan laws they should be classified as such.123 
The Tribunal reaffirmed its approach by holding that an ethnic group could be "a group identified 
as such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes”.124  
Further perplexing the issue of membership of a racial group in particular, however, the Tribunal 
stated that a "racial group is based on hereditary physical traits often identified with geography".125 
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This presumably is an unequivocal approval of the objective classification of a “racial group” that 
was outlined in the Akayesu judgement, despite the Trial Chamber’s subjective definition of the 
“ethnical group” by means of self-identification or identification of others.126  
Similarly, the ICTY in the Jelisic127 case clearly favored a subjective approach, being based on the 
perpetrator’s perception. The Tribunal held that: 
… to attempt to define a national, ethnical or religious group today using objective and 
scientifically irreproachable criteria would be a perilous exercise whose result would not 
necessarily correspond to the perception of the persons concerned by such categorization. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or religious group 
from the view of those persons who wish to single that group out from the rest of the community.128 
Further, unlike the ICTY in Kayeshema and Ruzindana, the ICTR in Jelisic explicitly rejected the 
objective approach taken in Akayesu in determining group status.129 Despite the ICTY’s subjective 
inquiry, however, the Tribunal in Jelisic took the view that the Convention was limited to “stable” 
and "permanent" human groups to which individuals belonged, regardless of their own desires.130 
Thus, despite the emphasis on the subjective stigmatization of the group, the Tribunal did not 
approve of an extension of protection to groups otherwise excluded by the Convention (such as 
political or social groups).  
Some scholars have likewise advocated for a subjective approach to determining group 
membership of the victims of genocide broadly, and to “racial groups” more particularly. In a 
recent study, Lingaas specifically assumes an analysis of the notion of “racial” in the provisions 
of the crimes of genocide, persecution and apartheid.131 The author correctly acknowledges that 
the notion of “race” is a social construct that is often used by social actors to justify inequality.132 
However, the author stops short of a scrutiny into the role of institutionalized racism in 
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perpetuating racial hierarchy.  Lingaas instead suggests that race should assume a “double-
subjective” approach – which allows for either self-perception, the perpetrator’s perception or a 
combination of both.133 According to the author, it is of paramount importance for the subjective 
approach to equally account for both the victim’s perception of their difference and the 
perpetrator’s.134 In doing so, Lingaas rejects any attempts to define a “racial group” objectively on 
the basis that to do so would mean relying on highly contested, outdated and scientifically refuted 
notions of racial difference based on physical characteristics.135 The author further cautions that, 
“any efforts to objectively define a protected group have proven to be artificial, suffered from 
serious analytical flaws and bore no relation at all to the group as ultimately targeted”.136  
Similarly, Gaeta rejects the proposed practicalities of an attempt to define the four enumerated 
groups objectively, arguing that these groups are purely social entities,137 and argues that applying 
objective notions could reveal that some groups are objectively and scientifically non-existent.138 
The author instead advocates for a purely subjective approach that is entirely dependent on the 
perception of the perpetrator, provided that that “the genocidal intent of the perpetrator [is] directed 
towards one of the enumerated groups”.139 The author further finds it unnecessary to establish 
whether victims of genocidal acts actually belong to the group that is being targeted, reasoning 
that it is more the perpetrator’s belief that the victim is part of the group being targeted that is 
fundamental.140  
Lingaas too rejects a subjective approach that is unrestrictedly based on the perception of the 
perpetrator,141 arguing that by relying solely on the perpetrator’s perception there exists a 
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possibility of any group becoming a target for genocide.142 In respect of the definition of a “racial 
group”, Lingaas cautions that following such an approach would risk an expansion of the definition 
of the same.143  
In a more recent study,  Lingaas suggests incorporating the theory of ‘Imagined Identities’ into 
law to cure the inadequacies of using either a purely objective or a purely subjective approach.144 
The theory of ‘Imagined Identities’ essentially holds that a group is treated as real once its members 
have formed a “like-mindedness” with those who they perceive to be similar to them.145 This group 
simultaneously perceives themselves as distinct from others who are supposedly not similar to 
them.146 The “realness” of this differentiation is solidified with the passing of time, with two 
groups eventually being created: ‘”us” and “them”’.147  
Lingaas then extends the application of this theory into law.148 The author builds on the essence of 
the current subjective approach but incorporates the theory of ‘Imagined Identities’ to bring the 
perception of the perpetrator in line with the principle of legality (more specifically, the principles 
of foreseeability and specificity).149 According to Lingaas, a group is treated as real once it 
becomes ‘effective’.150 Relative to the crime of genocide, the ‘effectiveness’ of the group is 
generated when a perpetrator sees victims as members of a “racial group” and treats them as 
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perception, however, that there exists a risk of genocide.152 When this happens, the group becomes 
an objective category worthy of legal and social protection.153  
Lingaas suggests that, on this approach, “any initially subjective and imagined differences between 
the groups become solidified, effective and real, thereby providing the courts with the objectivity 
required in order to determine the victim groups of genocide”.154 Such an approach still gives 
prominence to the perpetrator’s perception, whilst acknowledging the contemporary view that 
“race” is a social construct.155 To acquire legal protection from genocide, the victim’s membership 
to a racial group must be determined by the perpetrator’s perception.156 This approach also clearly 
steers away from problematic objective verifiers of “race” and instead depends entirely on the 
perception of differentness.157 The author accordingly suggests removing the classification of 
victims (into one of the protected groups) from the actus reus and requiring it in the proof of the 
perpetrator’s mens rea instead.158 According to Lingaas, the prosecution would, therefore, be 
tasked with having to prove the perpetrator’s subjective belief that the victim was a member of the 
relevant group.159  
Verdirame similarly argues for the idea of collective identities being regarded as purely social 
constructs, having been exclusively derived from perception: 
collective identities (…) are by their very nature social constructs, ‘imagined’ identities entirely 
dependent on variable and contingent perceptions, and not social facts, which are verifiable in the 
same manner as natural phenomena or physical facts.160  
Scholars have acknowledged, and in some cases supported, the supposedly “quiet” shift towards 








158 Ibid 102. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Verdirame (note 13 above; 592). 
35 
 
membership under the genocide provisions161. It can be argued however that adopting such an 
approach is particularly problematic when it comes to the interpretation of a “racial group”. By 
affording primacy to the perception of the perpetrator, the subjective approach has the effect of 
treating the hierarchization of “race” as a practice that has no existence outside the mind of the 
perpetrator. It, thus, reduces “race” to an individualized social fiction. It can be argued, however, 
that, in actuality, racial hierarchy is perpetuated through institutionalized means. Accordingly, 
racial hegemony is an ever-present phenomenon that has a material effect; it exists notwithstanding 
the purely social construction of the notion of “race” and the subjective stigmatization of others 
by an individual. To overlook this is to undermine the dire the consequences that structural racism 
has in law and society.   
Regarding Lingaas’ “Imagined Identities”, the author rightfully takes cognizance of the social 
construction of “race” and the need to move away from crystallizing the notion into controversial 
objective measures. In addition, it is agreed with the author that legal rules of interpretation, which 
dictate for legal terms to be given both precise definition and maximum effect, must be given due 
recognition. It can be argued, however, that the author’s approach can too be deemed problematic 
in a number of respects. In the first, the author seems to revert to adopting a generic approach to 
all four protected groups generally, and thus a historically deficient approach to race specifically.  
By not accounting for the very specific way in which racial hegemony has been constituted, the 
general application of the theory of ‘Imagined Identities’ into law renders the notion of “race" 
virtually indistinguishable from the etymologies of ethnicity, religion and nationality.  
In the second, the author’s approach can arguably be confronted with the same critiques as those 
already postulated against adopting a purely subjective (eliminativist) approach. The author’s 
approach arguably treats the existence of racial classification (and thus the ‘realness’ of race) as 
entirely conditional upon the subjective mind of the perpetrator. Racial categorization is therefore 
treated as a choice, in which racial status is taken to be “more voluntary and consequently less 
imposed, less ‘ascribed’”.162 As a result, the deliberate assignment of group identity on the basis 
of race, that has been historically used for the establishment of human hierarchy, domination and 
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subordination, becomes undesirably underplayed. This arguably has the adverse effect of stripping 
“race” of all historical context and bypassing the entrenchment of racialization as a material 
constant in the fabric of society by structures.  
3.2.3. Mixed approach  
The mixed approach has been proposed as an alternative to addressing the inadequacies (illustrated 
above) of using either a purely objective or a purely subjective approach. Such an approach, 
however, is arguably no less contentious than that which it seeks to resolve with regard to its 
usefulness in establishing group membership of a racial group in particular. It will be illustrated 
that, in general, international tribunals have struggled to adequately outline the exact contours of 
the mixed approach. Further, those scholars who have attempted to add substance to the mixed 
approach have done so controversially.  
The ICTY in the Brdanin163 took precisely a mixed approach, claiming, firstly, that the relevant 
protected group: 
… may be identified by means of the subjective criterion of the stigmatization of the group, notably 
by the perpetrators of the crime, on the basis of its perceived (...) racial (...) characteristics. In some 
instances, the victim may perceive himself or herself to belong to the aforesaid group.164  
The Tribunal then went on to suggest that the determination of a protected group ought to be made 
on a case-by-case basis, using both objective and subjective criteria.165 The Tribunal 
acknowledged the inadequacy of exclusively relying on subjective criteria for the determination 
 
163 The Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment (1 September 2004) 
164 Ibid 683. 
165 Ibid 684. 
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of group membership.166 It failed, however, to disclose the what factors an objective assessment 
would require for the legal definition of the protected group.167  
The ICTR in Bagilishema168 acknowledged that the four protected groups, including the racial 
group, do not enjoy a widely accepted definition.169 The Tribunal went on to suggest that, while 
the membership of the targeted group must be an objective feature of the relevant society, there is 
also a subjective dimension that must be given due consideration.170 The Tribunal therefore also 
seemed to suggest a mixed approach to determining group membership. The Tribunal took care in 
detailing the subjective approach, holding that if a victim is perceived by a perpetrator as belonging 
to a protected group, the victim would be considered a member of such group for the purposes of 
genocide.171 The tribunal neglected, however, defining the elements of the objective portion of the 
assessment.     
Nersessian too argues for a hybrid approach (involving the subjective view of the perpetrator 
coupled with a baseline objective standard) to understanding the four protected groups in the 
Genocide Convention.172 Szpak concurs with Nersessian in suggesting that an objective-subjective 
approach is the most appropriate method for determining the existence of a protected group.173  
Nersessian, unlike the ad hoc tribunals however, has suggested what the content of the objective 
criteria should entail: 
At a minimum (…) there must be some colorable evidence that the victim group has some recognize 
racial, national, ethnic or  religious existence outside of the mind of the perpetrator.174  
According to the author, this ‘colorable evidence’ can be drawn from the objective features of 
group membership that were outlined in Akayesu and Kayishema and Ruzindana. The difference 
 
166 Ibid. 
167 Lingaas (note 16 above; 100). 
168 The Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Trial Chamber Judgment, June 7, 2001, ICTR-95-1A-T. 
169 Ibid 65. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Nersessian (note 1 above; 326). 
173 Szpak (note 130 above; 164). 
174 Nersessian (note 1 above; 312) 
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with Nersessian’s approach, however, is that the objective evidence will operate as limiting-
mechanism to ensure that there is a logical connection between a perpetrator’s subjective existence 
of the group and the group’s “pre-genocidal existence”.175 In following this method, Nersessian 
and Szpak argue the limitations of a purely subjective approach.176  
Although acknowledging the confines of using a purely subjective approach marks a step right 
direction, it can be argued that the mixed approach remains too ambiguous and indeterminate for 
the purposes of securing a proper legal definition for the racial group. It can be further argued that 
scholars who have suggested the contents of the objective elements of a mixed approach sustain 
the same critique that has been posited against attempts to accord a degree of objectivity to a racial 
group - that it preserves an antiquated means of classification, by drawing on biological 
characteristics. 
 
3.3.  Conclusion  
This part of the study considered and critically engaged with international criminal law’s 
conceptualization of “race”. It specifically focused on the issues surrounding the interpretation of 
“racial groups” in the crime of genocide and the methods of interpretation offered by international 
tribunals and scholars in respect of such. It has been submitted that the existing methods of 
interpretation detrimentally assume ahistorical understandings of the notion of “race” and overlook 
the structural nature of racial hegemony and its materiality in contemporary society. On this basis, 
the final part of this study will seek to offer an alternative theorisation of “race” in the crime of 
genocide, using Glasgow’s third racial theory (‘racial reconstructionism’) as a theoretical basis. 
 
175 Ibid 313. 
176 Ibid 296; Szpak (note 126 above; 164). 
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This will presumably aid in providing a more legally sound interpretation of “racial groups” in the 


























A  RACE-CONSCIOUS APPROACH 
4.1  Introduction 
This part of the study aims to bring together the critiques of the objective and subjective approaches 
offered by international tribunals and scholars, and Glasgow’s racial theories (racial 
conservationism and racial eliminativism respectively), in order to highlight the flaws inherent in 
adopting either approach. This part will then call for an alternative theorisation of “race” in the 
crime of genocide, using Glasgow’s third racial theory (‘racial reconstructionism’) as a theoretical 
basis. Such an approach, it will argue, provides a more legally sound interpretation of “racial 
groups” in the crime of genocide, and takes into account the particular role of “race” in South 
Africa’s recent past.   
4.2 Theoretical parallels  
4.2.1 The objective approach and racial conservationism 
As discussed in part I, proponents of racial conservationism essentially argue for racial categories 
and labels to be preserved in contemporary discourse. It has been argued, however, that 
conceptualizing “race” through the lens of racial conservationism in modern-day race discourse is 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, racial conservationism overlooks that the practice of 
classifying humans on the basis of their skin color has troubling antecedents in biological and 
hereditary justifications for racial hierarchization, domination and subordination. Second, racial 
conservationism disregards the ongoing perpetuation of racial hegemony through structures, such 
as the law.   
A comparison of racial conservationism with the objective approach to interpreting “racial groups” 
arguably reveals that the latter embraces the perturbing ideological tenets of the former. Attempts 
by international ad hoc tribunals and legal scholars to apply an objective approach to interpreting 
“racial groups” in the crime of genocide have been consistently inundated with references to 
distinctions based on corporeal markers of identity. This arguably remains the case whether a 
purely objective approach or a certain degree of objectivity when defining the group has been 
suggested. As a consequence, (and as previously mentioned) the objective approach has been 
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criticized for preserving an antiquated, scientifically discredited and historically hegemonic means 
of differentiation.  
Additionally, attempts to crystallize the four protected groups, in general, into objective, stable 
and permanent notions can be criticized for its failure to take cognizance of the well-reiterated fact 
that “race”, in particular, is a purely social construction. The notion of “race” has been historically 
manufactured by those in power, to justify inequality and subordination. Thus, to treat the concept 
of “race” as a social fact is to detrimentally mischaracterize the origins of racialization. Further, 
an overemphasis on racialization based on physical identifiers arguably runs the risk of 
institutionalized racial hierarchy, and its role in the conserving and widening the chasm of racial 
hegemony, becoming fatally diminished in legal considerations.  
4.2.2 The subjective approach and racial eliminativism  
Protagonists of racial eliminativism argue for the complete elimination of the notion of “race” from 
political and legal processes, private thoughts and means of identifications.177 The purported 
agenda behind approaching racial discourse through racial eliminativism is to ultimately achieve 
non-racialization and harmony amongst a society that has been previously divided along racial 
lines. A number of fundamental criticisms have been leveled, however, against adopting an 
eliminativist approach to contemporary race discourse. This approach has been criticized for, in 
the first, normalizing the current state of racial inequality. It arguably does so by denying the 
historical role of “race” and overlooking the structures that continue to reinforce and perpetuate 
racist agendas in modern-day society.  
Further criticism, in the second, is premised on racial eliminativism’s theoretical parallels to 
liberalism. Liberalism similarly advocates for a ‘color-blind’ approach to achieving non-
racialization.178 It has been argued, however, that a troubling consequence of adopting a ‘color-
blind’ approach to racial discourse is that “racism” becomes reduced to only the most blatant, 
individual acts of racism. The result is a perpetuation of the idea that, outside of a privatized 
understanding of “race”, “race” has no real presence and effect in law and legal processes. It has, 
therefore, been argued that adopting an eliminativist approach to race discourse means that acts of 
 
177 Modiri (note 54 above; 412). 
178 Ibid 416. 
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racism becomes conditional upon and inseparable to an individual’s subjective construction of 
“race”, more specifically the subjective view of the perpetrator of racist acts.  
The ideological similarities between racial eliminativism and adopting a subjective approach to 
“racial groups” in the crime of genocide are striking. It can be argued that the subjective approach 
to “racial groups” is problematically charged with the ideological creeds of racial eliminativism. 
When it comes to the interpretation of “racial groups” in particular, it has been reasoned that 
affording primacy to the perception of the perpetrator (through the subjective approach) 
overemphasizes only those acts of racism that are the most blatant and individual. This presumably 
has the effect of treating the hierarchization of “race” as a practice that has no existence outside 
the mind of the perpetrator. The subjective approach, thus, reduces “race” to individualized 
attitudes. In doing so, using the subjective approach results in a failure to recognize that racial 
hegemony is an ever-present phenomenon that is perpetuated through structures, and that has a 
material effect in society. It overlooks that racial hegemony exists notwithstanding the purely 
social construction of the notion of “race” and the subjective stigmatization of others by an 
individual. 
4.3. Overall analysis  
Review of the relevant literature arguably reveals that, overall, attempts by international tribunals 
and scholars to develop means of interpretation through objective and subjective lenses have 
created a pendulum effect. Particularly when it comes to the “racial group” category, this “back-
and-forth” has resulted in scholars consistently, and problematically, assuming an ahistorical 
understanding of “race” and racial hegemony. By insistently engaging in an objective/subjective 
interpretive debate, the cumulative result is one of producing interpretations of “race” that are 
incommensurate with the etymology of its construction, its materiality in the fabric of society and 
its structural persistence in contemporary discourse. The pertinent question thus arises as to what 
then will arguably account for such gaps, whilst adhering to strict rules of legal interpretation? 
4.4. South Africa’s current race discourse  
Even more troublingly, South Africa’s post-1995 legal discourse has problematically shifted 
largely towards an eliminativist approach. This ‘color-blind’ or neutral approach arguably 
manifests itself as an indifference to, both, the most apparent form racism that existed during the 
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apartheid era and the more insidious structural presence of “race” that has since become engrained 
into the daily lives of South Africans.  
In the case of Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others179 (hereinafter AZAPO), the Constitutional Court was faced with a 
challenge to the constitutionality of section 20(7) of the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (hereinafter Act 34 of 1995).180 Most strikingly, at the advent of 
democracy (in 1996) the Constitutional Court in AZAPO was quick to sidestep, from the outset, 
the very notion that underpinned the workings of apartheid – race.  Interestingly, whilst the Court 
in AZAPO evaded the mention of race altogether in 1996, in 1998 the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda was more explicit in its conceptualization of race.  
In the first paragraph of its judgement, the Constitutional Court refers to apartheid as, ‘a deep 
conflict between a minority which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of 
state and a majority who sought to resist that domination’.181 Thereafter, reference is made to 
“those who were in power” and “those who resisted”.182 The use of this seemingly neutral 
terminology arguably depicts a failure to explicitly acknowledge that the conflict existed between 
Whites (the majority at the time) and Blacks (the minority at the time). Moreover, the 
Constitutional Court seems to mischaracterize the very cause of the oppression of that “minority”, 
describing it as a result of the resistance against those in control, rather than one caused by racist 
machinations by the apartheid state.183 This shows an evasion of the mention of “race” and 
“racism”, at its most basic conceptualization.  
Moreover, the Court seems to blatantly express an eliminativist approach to our post-1995 racial 
discourse by referring to a “previous history” of inequality, the “unjust consequences of the past” 
and the call to “close the book on that past”.184 By referring to racism as exclusively a matter of 
 
179 (CCT17/96) [1996] ZACC 16; 1996 (8) BCLR 1015; 1996 (4) SA 672 (25 July 1996). 
180 Section 20(7) of Act 34 of 1995 states that, “No person who has been granted amnesty in respect of an act, omission 
or offence shall be criminally or civilly liable in respect of such act, omission or offence and no body or organisation 
or the State shall be liable, and no person shall be vicariously liable, for any such act, omission or offence.” 
181 AZAPO (note 252 above) 1. 
182 Ibid 2, 3 & 4. 
183 Ibid 1 &2.  
184 Ibid 3. 
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the past, the Court failed to acknowledge the material effect that race currently has in the lives of 
South Africans. According to Modiri, this “past” inequality is, in reality, entrenched post-1995 
through the economic, cultural and social structures engineered during apartheid that continue to 
operate unchanged. The author argues that this racial inequality reveals itself through the present 
unequal distribution in wealth, education, power and employment.185  Significantly, the conclusion 
reached by the Court (that Section 20(7) of Act 34 of 1995 was not unconstitutional) marked the 
beginning and end of the possibility of prosecutions for atrocities committed during apartheid that 
were granted amnesty, including those acts that could possibly be classified as a genocide.186  
The eliminativist approach to race also infiltrates more current  South African legal discourse and 
attitudes surrounding racism. A prime example of this is arguably seen in recent efforts to 
criminalize hate speech, through the tabling of the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and 
Hate Speech Bill of 2016 (hereinafter the Bill) and public comments submitted on its draft. More 
specifically, the charge of eliminativism in contemporary South African discourse is based on 
South Africa’s policy efforts to give further permanency to the already largely privatized 
 
185 Modiri (note 54 above; 406 & 431). 
186 AZAPO (note 252 above) 50 & 51. 
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understanding of race, where racism is seen to be manifested through only the most blatant acts 
committed by individuals. 
Notably, the Bill defines the ‘offence of hate speech’ to be: 
4. (1) (a) Any person who intentionally publishes, propagates or advocates anything or 
communicates187 to one or more persons in a manner that could reasonably be construed to 
demonstrate a clear intention to—  
(i) be harmful or to incite harm; or  
(ii) promote or propagate hatred. 
based on one or more of the following grounds: … 
(ll) race…188   
In a briefing on the Bill, the Deputy Director-General of Legislative Development, Ms. Kalayvani 
Pillay, stated that the Bill was proposed to address the rising number of hate crimes and hate 
speeches in the country and the spate of incidents that were motivated by prejudices based on hate 
crimes and hate speeches.189  Amongst the surge of recent incidents involving offensive comments 
was one that occurred in January 2016, where Penny Sparrow (a white South African) took to 
Facebook to describe black beachgoers as “monkeys”.190 Sparrow’s comment was posed as a 
reaction to the seemingly littered state that the beaches were left in after New Year’s 
celebrations.191 Other allegedly racist comments by Whites soon followed, with Chris Hart 
tweeting about, what he views to be, the growing sense of entitlement, victimhood and hatred 
 
187 The Bill’s definition of communication widely includes any ‘written, illustrated, visual, or other descriptive matter’, 
as well as any ‘display’, ‘oral statement’ or ‘electronic communication’. Section 1 of the Bill.  
188 Section 4(1) of the Bill. 
189 ‘Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill & International Crimes Bill: Briefing, with 
Minister and Deputy Minister’ Parliamentary Monitoring Group available at 
https://pmg.org.za/page/Prevention%20and%20Combating%20of%20Hate%20Crimes%20and%20Hate%20Speech
%20Bill%20&%20International%20Crimes%20Bill:%20briefing,%20with%20Minister%20and%20Deputy%20Mi
nister, accessed on 20 July 2019.   
190 J Wicks ‘‘It’s just the facts’ - Penny Sparrow breaks her silence’ (4 January 2016), News24 available at 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/its-just-the-facts-penny-sparrow-breaks-her-silence-20160104, 




towards minorities 25 years after the end of apartheid.192 He was subsequently suspended by his 
employer on account of the alleged racist undertones of his statement.193 As a reaction to such 
comments, Velaphi Khumalo, an employee of the Gauteng provincial administration, called for 
Whites to be “hacked and killed like Jews” and for their children to be “used as garden 
fertilizers”.194 He too was suspended by his employer.195  
The Bill imposes penalties to prevent and combat the offence of hate speech.196 Any person 
convicted of hate speech, the intentional electronic distribution of hate speech, or any of the other 
stated ancillary offences, is liable on a first conviction for a fine or to imprisonment for up to three 
years, or to both of these penalties. Subsequent convictions are liable to a fine and/or imprisonment 
of up to ten years.197 The Bill was purportedly proposed in line with the need for sustained 
campaigns against, amongst other prejudices, racism.198  
It is evident that the Bill unequivocally seeks to combat racism that assumes the form of intentional 
and obvious individual prejudices. This is arguably a stark manifestation of the consequences of 
adopting an eliminativist approach to race discourse that South African legal discourse has 
embraced. An individualized understanding of racism is arguably overemphasized to the detriment 
of recognizing racism as that which is troubling embedded and perpetuated through structures as 
well.  
Interestingly, the submissions on the Bill made by the South African Institute of Race Relations 
(hereinafter the IRR) shed light onto contemporary attitudes surrounding racism. The IRR report199 
 
192 F Salie ‘Standard Bank suspends Chris Hart over ‘racist’ tweet’ (4 January 2016), Fin24 available at 
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20160104, accessed on 25 July 2019. 
193 Ibid.  
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199 South African Institute of Race Relations NPC (IRR) Submission to the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
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notes that two recent field surveys conducted in 2015 and 2016, commissioned by the IRR, reveal 
that few South Africans in general (and even fewer Black people) identify race as a serious 
problem.200 The surveys purportedly revealed that people were more concerned with issues such 
as employment, poor education, service delivery failures and inadequate housing. The field 
surveys additionally asked respondents about their personal experiences of racism.201 In 2016, 
approximately 71% of blacks purported to have not experienced racism in their daily lives.202 The 
IRR notes that these two surveys consisted of a carefully balanced sample of South Africans, taken 
from all provinces and all socio-economic groups.203 They further note that the samples were fully 
representative in terms of race, age, employment status and other factors.204  
Perhaps the methodology of the study can be critiqued for its liberal approach to race relations in 
South Africa. However, proceeding on the assumption that these statistics assume a more wholistic 
perspective, the results are useful in revealing that the acknowledgement of structural racism by a 
considerable number of South Africans is minimal, if not, non-existent. Particularly the demand 
for resolving issues such as employment, poor education and inadequate housing, instead of 
individual racism, arguably reveals that contemporary attitudes overlook the systemic nature of 
race. It overlooks the racialized patterns that the system produces and sustains through the very 
distribution of wealth, power, education, housing, service delivery and employment. This, coupled 
with the privatized understanding of racism adopted by policymakers, perturbingly resounds an 
eliminativist approach that pervades South African race discourse.  
4.4. Recommendations: a race-conscious approach 
It is submitted that the solution to the interpretation of “racial groups” in the crime of genocide is 
simple: a race-conscious approach that entails a reading down of “an act committed with intent to 
 
200 Ibid 5. The surveys purportedly reveal that, in the 2016 survey, 3.2% of the respondents– and 2.4% of blacks – 
identified racism as a serious unresolved problem. Together with inequality and xenophobia, those numbers rose to 
6.4% of all respondents and 5.9% of blacks. This number saw a slight increase from September 2015. Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
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destroy a racial group” to mean “white global supremacy”. Although simple in its claim, such an 
approach arguably tackles multiple complexities of interpretation at once.  
Approaching legal interpretation of “race” in the crime of genocide through the critical framework 
of “global white supremacy” would importantly entail, in the first, putting “race” back on the 
agenda. It would involve a significant move away from current eliminativist/liberal conceptual 
frameworks, which treat “race” and “racism” as virtually non-existent in contemporary socio-legal 
discourse. The current subjective approach (which affords primacy to the subjective mind of the 
alleged perpetrator of genocide) arguably adopts problematic eliminativist understandings of 
“race”. This has the undesirable effect of removing racism as a material reality and, instead, 
reducing it to an individualized social fiction (where racism could seemingly “come and go” at the 
whim of the perpetrator). From a Critical Race perspective however, racism is that which is 
perpetuated and embedded in society through structures, such as the law. To ignore this would 
arguably be to deny the ongoing effects of racial hegemony. Especially if an alleged genocide 
committed against a racial group were to come to South African courts, one cannot simply ignore 
the very specific form of racism that has, since pre-democratic South Africa, been institutionally 
embedded into the workings of society and which arguably reveals itself through unequal 
distribution in wealth, education, power and employment.   
In the second, approaching the crime of genocide using ‘white global supremacy’ as the primary 
conceptual framework will limit acts perpetrated against a racial group to only those acts 
perpetrated against non-Whites. This is premised on the reality that racial hegemony assumes a 
very specific social ontology, that has been historically constituted in a very specific manner.205 
As pointed out by Rodney in Mills: 
The essence of White Power is that it is exercised over [nonwhite] peoples -whether or not they 
are minority or majority, whether it was a country belonging originally to whites or to 
[nonwhites].206 (emphasis added)  
As such, racial hegemony and racism has historically been the exertion of White power over non-
White people. This power-play arguably continues to exist in the current social, economic and 
 
205 Mills (note 126 above; 106). 
206 Ibid 99. 
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legal schemas of contemporary society. Importantly, on this reading, “White” is understood to be 
a systemic and hegemonic phenomenon207; it is not a specific phenotype of persons.208 Mills argues 
that “whiteness” is, in fact, that which is learned by a certain phenotypic group of persons who 
grow up in a racist society that institutionally privileges whites, as a group, over non-whites.209 
This is not to say that genocide cannot be committed against persons historically classified as 
“White”. In fact, any such group of persons (who do not fall within this very specific definition of 
acts committed against a non-White racial group) could very well constitute an ethnic, national or 
religious group for the purposes of genocide. The purpose of such an approach is to conceptually 
separate genocidal acts perpetrated against racial groups from those perpetrated against ethnic, 
national and religious groups, to better comply with the rules of legal interpretation.  
This socio-structural conceptualization of “race” also clearly avoids attaching discredited 
biological generalizations to groups of persons (that almost invariably comes with attempts to 
apply an objective approach to “race”). By conceptualizing racism as “global white supremacy”, 
the classification of a group of persons as a “racial group” for the purposes of genocide is not 
dependent on physical markers of identity. Instead, such a classification becomes entirely 
contingent upon whether a non-White group has been historically and structurally subordinated by 
the social phenomenon that is White power. Such an approach also accommodates for the fact that 
“race” is purely a social construction, rather than a scientific and biological fact. 
4.5. Conclusion  
In sum, approaching legal interpretation of the crime of genocide through the race-conscious 
framework of “Global White supremacy” will arguably produce the following outcomes at once: 
“race” is understood as material enough to be objective, socially constituted enough to be a social 
construction and specific enough in definition to comply with the strict rules of legal interpretation. 
Consequently, a reading down of genocidal acts committed against a racial group to be “global 
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White supremacy” will have the effect of detaching the notion of “race” from the conceptual matrix 
that has entangled it since its very inclusion (and exclusion) in international criminal law. Race 
(and all the consequences that have come with its misuse) has been historically conceptualized in 
a very specific manner. To think otherwise would arguably mean to, firstly, disregard the workings 
of racial hegemony and the ways in which it continues to insidiously structure contemporary 
society to produce racialized outcomes, including genocidal ones. Secondly, it would arguably be 
in conflict with the very rules of legal interpretation, which strictly demand for legal terms to have 
clear and precise meaning.  
4.6. Implications for South Africa 
Such an approach is particularly important when considering the current social, legal and political 
state of South Africa. As illustrated above, South African socio-legal discourse has problematically 
moved towards an eliminativist approach to “race”. This is evident in the largely eliminativist 
attitudes of contemporary society, the privatized understanding of racism adopted by our 
policymakers and the “colourblind” approach to race taken by the highest court in our land. If a 
case of alleged genocide against a racial group were to come to South African domestic courts, 
could we simply “turn a colourblind eye” to the deeply rooted legacy of racism that continues to 
unsettle South African society structurally? If we were to, it can be argued that there could 
conceivably be a “flipping” of victims, where claims of genocidal racism could be launched 
against those who continue to be victims of our deeply troubled past, by those who continue to 
benefit from it. Perhaps the current research begs a further question of whether, on Mill’s 
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conception that takes “Whiteness” to be a hegemonic and structural phenomenon, there could ever 
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